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Statutes of Limitations-FLORIDA ADOPTS STRICT APPROACH TO
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION-Homemakers, Inc. v. Gonzales, 400 So.
2d 965 (Fla. 1981)
Until recently, it was well established in Florida that legislative
enlargements of statutes of limitations would be applied retroac-
tively to persons with existing causes of action. The Florida Su-
preme Court, in Homemakers, Inc. v. Gonzales,1 reversed that
rule, holding that if the legislature enlarges a statute of limitations
period, the enlargement will only be prospective "unless the legis-
lative intent to provide retroactive effect is express, clear and
manifest."2
The Gonzales opinion heralded a far-reaching and significant de-
feat for plaintiffs. The holding in Gonzales, rather than being lim-
ited to medical malpractice statutes of limitations at issue in the
case, appears to be applicable to most causes of action. Plaintiffs
no longer will be given the benefit of an enlarged limitation period
without clearly manifested legislative intent. None of the amend-
ments to the statute of limitations since 19741 appear to have the
required manifestation of legislative intent,4 thus making it diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to successfully argue that they should receive the
benefit of any amendment which enlarges the limitation period
when the cause of action accrued prior to the amendment. Gonza-
les is a radical shift from the approach adopted by three of the
four district courts of appeal that have considered this question.
This note will examine the case law and policy considerations
which support the majority and dissent approaches. Additionally,
this note will discuss a possible exception to the apparent broad-
reaching effect of Gonzales.'
Gonzales involved an interpretation of two sections of the Flor-
ida Statutes6 which amended the former statute of limitations for
1. 400 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1981).
2. Id. at 967.
3. The statute of limitations was amended by the following: ch. 77-174, § 1, 1977 Fla.
Laws 719; ch. 78-435, § 11, 1978 Fla. Laws 1448; ch. 80-322, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 1389.
4. Although the court in Gonzales did not indicate what language would be a sufficient
manifestation of retroactive legislative intent, it appears that at least a statement by the
legislature that they intend the benefits of any enlarged statute of limitations period to be
given to actions accrued, but not yet barred, is required.
5. The court stated, "The rule was correctly stated in Brooks that a statute of limita-
tions will be prospectively applied unless the legislative intent to provide retroactive effect
is express, clear and manifest." 400 So. 2d at 967.
6. Ch. 74-382, § 7, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207 reads:
An action for professional malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; pro-
vided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is
discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence; pro-
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medical malpractice actions." The two-year limitation period re-
mained unchanged in the 1974 amendment. The plaintiff, however,
focused on a change in language which stated that an action for
professional malpractice was now limited to persons "in privity
with the professional."8
Gonzales alleged that she was permanently disfigured due to the
negligent administration of an injection by a nurse with whom she
was not in privity. The defendant's motion for summary judgment
based upon the two-year statute of limitations was denied by the
circuit court. The plaintiff appealed to the First District Court of
Appeal, 9 arguing that the two-year statute of limitations was not
applicable because its privity requirement excluded her claim and
required it to be classified with actions governed by longer limita-
tions periods.
vided, however, that the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice
shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional.
The subsequent amendment (effective May 20, 1975) provided separately for medical
malpractice and also had a privity requirement. It was located at ch. 75-9, § 7, 1975 Fla.
Laws 13:
(b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within two years from
the time the incident occurred giving rise to the action, or within two years from
the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered with the exer-
cise of due diligence, provided, however, that in no event shall the action be com-
menced later than four years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of
which the cause of action accrued. An action for medical malpractice is defined as
a claim in tort or in contract for damages .. . [against] any provider of health
care. The limitation of actions within this subsection shall be limited to the health
care provider and persons in privity with the provider of health care....
The present version of the statute of limitations for medical malpractice is the same as
the 1975 version listed above and still has a two year period. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1979).
The savings clause, located at ch. 74-382, § 36, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207, reads:
This act shall become effective on January 1, 1975, but any action that will be
barred when this act becomes effective and that would not have been barred
under prior law may be commenced before January 1, 1976, and if is not com-
menced by that date, the action shall be barred.
7. Ch. 73-333, § 30, 1973 Fla. Laws 828 provided:
(6) WITHIN TWO YEARS.- . . . [A]n action to recover damages for injuries
to the person arising from any medical . . . treatment or surgical operation, the
cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the plaintiff
discovers, or through use of reasonable care should have discovered, the injury.
8. The "privity" section to ch. 74-382, § 7, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207 was added by two differ-
ent amendments. The language "provided, however that actions herein shall be limited to
persons in privity" was added by the Fla. CS for CS for HB 895 (1974) which was passed as
amended by the House on April 16, 1974. The language "with the professional" was pro-
posed by House Representative Papy on the House floor on April 16, 1974, and was
adopted. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 330 (Reg. Sess. 1974).
9. Gonzales v. Jacksonville Gen. Hosp., Inc., 365 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978), quashed sub nom. Homemakers Inc. v. Gonzales, 400 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1981).
CASE NOTES
The plaintiff argued both that case law required retroactive ap-
plication of subsequent amendments to a statute of limitations en-
larging the time period so long as the former limitation period had
not run prior to the amendment, and that the savings clause sup-
ported her argument.10 The plaintiff asserted that both of these
conditions were met. First, there would be an enlargement if the
amended malpractice statute was retroactively applied to her cause
of action. The action would no longer fall under the two-year limi-
tation period for professional malpractice since she was not in
privity with the nurse. Instead, the four-year limitation period of
either the general negligence statute,1' or alternatively, the general
catch-all section,12 would be applicable to her cause of action.1"
The result would be a two-year extension of time for the plaintiff
to file her action. The plaintiff also demonstrated that the amend-
ment had occurred prior to the barring of her action under the
former statute of limitations. Thus, the plaintiff argued that the
four-year, rather than the two-year, limitation period was applica-
ble to her cause of action.
The First District Court of Appeal's decision, which adopted the
plaintiff's arguments, was quashed by the Florida Supreme Court.
The supreme court reinstated the trial court's order of final sum-
mary judgment based upon the original two-year malpractice stat-
ute of limitations.' In an opinion authored by Justice Adkins, the
court announced a new test of retroactivity for enlarged statutes of
limitations. It held that enlarged statute of limitations periods
would be limited to prospective application except where there was
a clear manifestation of legislative intent that the statute was to be
applied retrospectively. The court made no mention of the fact
that Gonzales' claim was founded on a language change in the stat-
ute that made another statute of limitations applicable to her
claim. Thus, the Gonzales rule apparently is intended to apply to
all enlarged limitation periods, whether created by a language
change or a legislative enlargement of the applicable period.
The court further stated that a savings clause did not manifest
the required legislative intent to make enlarged periods retroac-
10. 365 So. 2d at 803-04.
11. Ch. 74-382, § 7, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207 provided: "(3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.- (a)
An action founded on negligence."
12. Ch. 74-382, § 7,1974 Fla. Laws 1207 provided: "(3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.-..
(b) Any action not specifically provided for in these statutes."
13. 365 So. 2d at 803.
14. 400 So. 2d at 968.
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tive. Rather, the savings clause applied only to those periods
"shortened by the amended statute, and has no application where
time periods remained the same or were lengthened." 6 A savings
clause is a provision often placed at the end of an amendment to a
statute of limitations. One portion of the clause usually delays the
effective date of a statutory change so as to provide fair warning to
those persons who might be affected by the change. This portion of
the savings clause is commonly referred to as the "grandfather
clause." 6 It is often seen on statutes other than statutes of limita-
tions. The savings clause in a statute of limitations also often pro-
vides additional time for persons to file their cause of action if the
cause of action would not be barred under the old statute.17
This second portion of the savings clause must indicate that the
legislature intended that the statute of limitations be retroactive.
For example, assume a statute of limitations was amended, short-
ening the limitation period from four to three years. Assume fur-
ther that the amendment became effective exactly three years and
one day after the plaintiff's cause of action accrued and that the
plaintiff had not filed his cause of action. In this situation, if the
amendment were retroactive it would apply to all claims not filed.
If the amendment did not have the second portion of the savings
clause, the plaintiff's cause of action would be barred when the
amendment became effective because more than three years had
passed since the cause of action accrued. It would fail under the
new statute even though under the old statute the plaintiff still
would have had 364 days to file. The savings clause is necessary to
provide the plaintiff additional time to file his already accrued ac-
tion. If the amendment were only prospective in nature, however,
it would apply only to causes of action accruing after its effective
date. The old statute of limitations of four years would still be in
effect for causes of action accruing before the amendment's effec-
tive date. There would therefore be no need to give the plaintiff
additional time to file the action and hence no need for a savings
clause. Therefore, the additional time portion of the savings clause
could only indicate that the legislature intended the amendment to
be retroactive.
15. Id. at 967 (emphasis in original).
16. See ch. 74-382, § 36, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207 which provided: "This act shall become
effective on January 1, 1975 .. "
17. See id. which provided: "[B]ut any action that will be barred when this act becomes
effective and that would not have been barred under prior law may be commenced before
Janaury 1, 1976, and if is not commenced by that date, the action shall be barred."
CASE NOTES
When an amendment with a savings clause contains both short-
ened and lengthened limitation periods, a new question arises. The
question is whether the legislature intended the entire amendment
to be retroactive or whether, because the savings clause only ap-
plies to shortened periods, only the shortened periods are to be
retroactively applied.
The supreme court addressed this question and disagreed with
the district court's conclusion. The district court interpreted the
savings clause to mean that all accrued actions became subject to
the provisions of the amendment. The statutory period newly ap-
plicable to plaintiff's claim would therefore enlarge her time to
file.18 The supreme court, however, construed the savings clause to
support retroactive application of shortened statutes of limitations
but not periods which were lengthened or remained the same.1
The supreme court stated that the original purpose of the savings
clause was to satisfy a constitutional mandate that the legislature
allow a reasonable time to file actions which had already accrued
when the legislature shortened a limitation period. The court then
stated that the savings clause should not be construed beyond this
specific purpose.20
The supreme court thus resolved the intercircuit conflict over
whether an enlarged statute of limitations period applies retroac-
tively,21 holding that generally it does not. The court explicitly
adopted the fourth circuit's approach in Brooks v. Cerrato2 2
Brooks provides support for the majority's position; however, it
seems to be a deviation from the general rule previously recognized
in Florida and other jurisdictions. The majority also cited two
other cases to support its position, but they are distinguishable.
Brooks was a medical malpractice action arising from an injury
which occured during surgery in 1973. The same statutes of limita-
tions involved in Gonzales were construed in Brooks.2- At the time
18. 365 So. 2d at 804.
19. 400 So. 2d at 967.
20. Id. The supreme court cited Foley v. Morris, 339 So. 2d at 215-16, to support the
proposition of a constitutional mandate.
21. The first, second, and third circuits followed the approach that enlarged limitation
periods were retroactive, e.g., Wetmore v. Brennan, 378 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979) cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1980); Mazda Motors of Am. Inc. v. S. C. Hender-
son & Sons Inc., 364 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 348
(Fla.1979); Neff v. General Dev. Corp., 354 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
whereas, the fourth district adopted the requirement of clear legislative intent, e.g., Brooks
v. Cerrato, 355 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1978).
22. 355 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1978).
23. Ch. 73-333, § 30, 1973 Fla. Laws 828; ch. 74-382, § 7, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207; and ch.
1981]
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of the operation, the statute of limitations allowed two years to file
the action from the time "the plaintiff discovers, or through use of
reasonable care could have discovered, the injury."24 The statute
was amended, effective January 1, 1975, leaving the two-year limit
the same, but commencing the period to "run from the time the
cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with
the exercise of due diligence."25 The plaintiff argued that the new
amendment should apply retroactively. Because the discovery of
her cause of action occurred after the discovery of the injury, in
effect, the new accrual language created an enlargement of the lim-
itation period. The plaintiff's argument that she should receive the
benefit of a statute of limitations period which is enlarged by a
language change is the same argument made by the plaintiff in
Gonzales. The court held that the amendment would not be ap-
plied retroactively, notwithstanding the savings clause,2 since the
savings clause did not clearly manifest legislative intent that it be
given retroactive effect. The court in Brooks indicated that a sav-
ings clause's grace period was a clear manifestation of legislative
intent to give retroactivity to causes of action which were short-
ened, but not to those which remained the same.27 Thus, Brooks is
in point, supporting the majority opinion, although it was charac-
terized by the dissent in Gonzales as coming from "out of the
blue."28
The majority in Gonzales also cited Foley v. Morris29 as support
for its position. Foley, too, was a medical malpractice action. The
plaintiff had a rubber drain left in his body during an operation
performed on April 14, 1971. It was removed on September 11,
1971. The supreme court determined that the plaintiff's cause of
action accrued on September 11, 1971. The statute of limitations
in effect in 1971 had a four-year limitation period commencing
from the date of the discovery of the injury.30 The defendant ar-
gued that because the suit was not filed until September 17, 1974,
the new statute which became effective on July 1, 1973, should be
74-382, § 36, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207.
24. Ch. 73-333, § 30, 1973 Fla. Laws 828 (emphasis supplied).
25. Ch. 74-382, § 7, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207 (emphasis supplied). This amendment is obvi-
ously pro-plaintiff because one almost always discovers the cause of action after the injury
was or should have been discovered.
26. Ch. 74-382, § 36, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207.
27. 355 So. 2d at 120.
28. 400 So. 2d at 968.
29. 339 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1976).
30. Ch. 21892, § 1, 1943 Fla. Laws 408.
1981] CASE NOTES
applied retroactively." The new statute, which shortened the limi-
tation period for filing an action to two years from the discovery of
the injury, did not have a savings clause. The court held that the
shortened statute of limitations was not to be retroactively
applied. 2
Foley does not support the majority's position because there is
an important and fundamental factual difference between Foley
and Gonzales. Foley involved an amendment which shortened the
statute of limitations period, whereas Gonzales involved an
amendment which enlarged the statute of limitations period." The
general rule of Foley should be limited to its particular facts (i.e.,
shortened limitation periods). The majority in Gonzales, however,
ignored this distinction by requiring that both types of statutory
amendments must meet the same stringent test of an "express,
clear and manifest" legislative intent.
3 4
Additionally, Foley stated that where "[t]here is reasonable
doubt concerning the legislative intention to provide retroactive ef-
fect to the newly added statute of limitations, § 95.11(6), . . . the
benefit of this doubt should here be given to the appellant-plain-
tiff, whose cause of action was dismissed." 5 The majority in Gon-
31. Ch. 73-333, § 30, 1973 Fla. Laws 828.
32. 339 So. 2d at 217.
33. The court in Foley relied on the position announced in 51 AM JUR. 2d Limitation of
Actions § 57 (1970) to support its position of retroactivity. 339 So. 2d at 217. A further
reading of that section, however, reveals that the reader is referred to an entirely different
section for amendments which extend limitation periods. This section states that unless the
amendatory act expressly provides otherwise, in a wide variety of causes of action the en-
larged limitation periods were intended by the legislature to apply to existing causes of
action not yet barred. 51 AM JUR. 2d Limitation of Actions § 41 (1970). This is a strong
indication that there are significant differences between the way in which courts handle
enlarged rather than shortened limitation periods.
34. 400 So. 2d at 967.
35. 339 So. 2d at 217 (quoting DeLuca v. Mathews, 297 So. 2d 854, 856 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1974)); see also Maltempo v. Cuthbert, 288 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 297 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1974). Note, however, that the above listed cases all involve
giving the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt when the period is shortened. But see, Glass v.
Camara, 369 So. 2d 625, 627, (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), which stated that there was a
good reason for extending the benefits of a lengthened period to medical malpractice claim-
ants because filing a medical mediation claim was a condition precedent. But see, Worrell v.
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 384 So. 2d 897, 901 n.3 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980),
which stated:
It is not completely clear whether Glass v. Camara, 369 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA
1979), applied Section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), effective Janu-
ary 1, 1975, or Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), effective May 20, 1975.
Although the opinion states that the later statute is being applied, the opinion
quotes from the earlier 1974 statute and relies specifically on the language "that
the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action [was] discov-
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zales never addressed this consideration of a reasonable doubt con-
cerning legislative intent.
Indeed, research into the legislation 6 which amended the statute
of limitations construed in Gonzales, revealed that there is a rea-
sonable doubt whether the amendment was intended to be retroac-
tively applied. There is no indication the legislature considered
this issue.-7
If the majority was consistently applying Foley, then it would
follow that the benefit of the doubt should be given to the plaintiff.
Applying this principle to new statutes of limitations which
shorten the time period would require that the new statute not be
given retroactive effect where there is reasonable doubt of legisla-
tive intent. The benefit of the doubt would flow to the plaintiff so
that the cause of action would not be dismissed. On the other
hand, this same consideration would support retroactive effect of
statutes of limitations which lengthen the time period where there
is a reasonable doubt as to legislative intent. This result would also
give the benefit of the doubt to a plaintiff so that the cause of
ered or should have been discovered" which is contained in the 1974 statute [Sec-
tion 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974)], rather than in the later 1975
statute.
Of course, Gonzales was claiming the benefit of an amendment enacted after her cause of
action arose, whereas the plaintiff in Foley was claiming the benefit of the statute in force
when the cause of action arose. Thus, the benefit Gonzales was seeking was qualitatively
different from that in issue in Foley.
36. Fla. CS for HB 895 (1974).
37. In a House Judiciary Committee Meeting the committee discussed the reason for the
grandfather provision of the savings clause. The section of the tape which may have in-
cluded a discussion of the effect of enlarging the period is so garbled that it is unclear
whether the committee even discussed this issue. Fla. H.R. Committee on Judiciary, tape
recording of proceedings (March 19, 1974) (on file in Florida Archives).
Mr. McFerrin Smith, former Executive Director of the Law Revision Council, attended all
of the committee meetings regarding Fla. H.B. 895 and at no time was he aware of any
committee discussion on the effect of enlarging the statute of limitations period. Phone con-
versation with the author (August 20, 1981), (record on file, FLA. ST. U.L. REv. library). In
addition, research of the Senate Judiciary Committee revealed the purpose behind the vast
revamping of the statute of limitations. During a meeting of the Committee, a Senator in-
quired into the purpose of the changes. The response was "what we did there Senator was,
one of the purposes of this was, the old statute of limitations has quite a few different
categories of time periods, and there was an effort to consolidate those into a fewer number
of time periods, so many of these changes were accomplishing that result." Fla. S., Commit-
tee on Judiciary, tape recording of proceedings (May 13, 1974) (on file in the Florida
Archives). In attendance were Senators Scarborough, Gillespie, Gruber, McClain, Weber,
and Wilson. In addition, McFerrin Smith, Executive Director of the Law Revision Council
was in attendance. Senator Johnston's attendance record was not marked. If the purpose of
the changes were for consolidation and efficiency reasons rather than specifically to change
the limitation periods, then this would be further support for the proposition that there was
reasonable doubt as to legislative intent regarding retroactivity.
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action would not be dismissed. Exactly the opposite result was
reached in Gonzales. The court, in effect, applied the reasoning in
Foley to the entirely different factual situation of Gonzales.
The third case which the majority in Gonzales cited as support
for its position is Carpenter v. Florida Central Credit Union."
The majority cited this case to support its contention that a sav-
ings clause is irrelevant as a manifestation of legislative intent for
periods which were enlarged or remained the same. Carpenter in-
volved a suit on a promissory note. The statute of limitations for
contract actions founded on written instruments was changed be-
tween the time of the default and the filing of the action. The
twenty-year statute of limitations' 9 was shortened to a five-year
period,40 and the amending statute had a savings clause.41 The
court held that "[t]he very nature of a savings clause imparts ret-
roactivity upon the statutes within its ambit" 42 and "[s]ections
95.11(2)(b) and 95.022, Florida Statutes (1975), are retrospective in
nature and constitutional as applied to promissory notes under
seal. ' 43 This holding is consistent with both pre-Gonzales and
post-Gonzales case law because it involves a shortened statute of
limitation period. The holding is also consistent with the Gonzales
dissent if one ignores the distinction between enlarged and short-
ened limitation periods, as did the majority in Gonzales when it
applied the concern of forfeitures resulting from a shortened pe-
riod to a lengthened statute of limitations period.
The majority in Gonzales, however, relied upon dicta in Carpen-
ter to support the contention that a savings clause does not mani-
fest legislative intent of retroactivity for statutes which either
lengthen or retain time periods previously provided. If one ac-
cepted the citation to Brooks in Carpenter4 as approval of the
38. 369 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 1979).
39. Ch. 21892, § 1, 1943 Fla. Laws 408 provided: "WITHIN TWENTY YEARS.- An
action upon a judgment or decree of a court of record in the State of Florida, and an action
upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument of writing under
seal."
40. Ch. 74-382, § 7, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207 provided: "WITHIN FIVE YEARS.-.. . A
legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation or liability founded on a written
instrument."
41. Ch. 74-382, § 36, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207.
42. 369 So. 2d at 937 (citing Nash v. Asher, 342 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977)) Nash was overruled in Garofalo v. Community Hosp. of South Broward, 382 So. 2d
722 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
43. 369 So. 2d at 938.
44. 369 So. 2d at 937 stated, "see Brooks v. Cerrato, 355 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 4th DCA
1978) ('[Tihe grace period allowed [in § 95.022] clearly pertains to causes of action which
1981]
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Brooks decision, then the adoption of that approach in Gonzales
might have been predictable.45 But the text of Carpenter never
discussed the issue as applied to lengthened periods because the
facts only involved a shortened period.
Apart from this questionable extension of dicta, it appears that
the majority's position in Gonzales is supported by very little case
law. The court never discusses the policy concerns behind its posi-
tion, nor does it attempt to distinguish the extensive case law that
the dissent uses to support its position.
The dissent's position in Gonzales is that plaintiffs should re-
ceive the benefit of extended statutes of limitations provided their
causes of action were not barred prior to the statutory amendment.
Justice England, with Chief Justice Sundberg concurring, stated
that such an approach was well accepted in Florida "until the
Fourth District Court of Appeal, out of the blue, applied the retro-
activity concerns of shortened statute cases to an extended statute
case. '"46 The dissent criticized the Gonzales opinion for rejecting
the prevailing view and adopting the minority position. The dis-
sent then presented a rather impressive, although incomplete, list
of cases which supported its position.4
Justice England cited two supreme court cases involving
worker's compensation as support for his position. In Corbett v.
General Engineering & Machinery Co.,48 the statute regarding the
filing of an original worker's compensation claim was amended.
The limitation period was enlarged from one to two years. The su-
preme court stated that the amendment was silent as to whether it
would apply to claims then in existence because it did not contain
a savings clause. Notwithstanding the lack of a savings clause, the
court held that an enlargement of a statute of limitations was to be
applied to benefit the plaintiff.49 Garris v. Weller Construction
were shortened by the amended statute.')." Brooks allows retroactive application of enlarged
statutes of limitations periods only if there is a clearly manifested legislative intent of
retroactivity.
45. Justice Adkins' position has remained consistent as he authored both Carpenter and
Gonzales. Justice Sundberg and Justice England dissented in Gonzales, disagreeing with the
adoption of the Brooks approach. Justice Sundberg's position has also remained consistent
because in Carpenter he concurred only in the result. His disagreement with the majority's
analysis in Carpenter must have been, in part, with the citation to Brooks. On the other
hand, Justice England concurred in Carpenter. Thus, his dissent in Gonzales to the adop-
tion of the Brooks approach was less predictable.
46. 400 So. 2d at 968.
47. Id.
48. 37 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1948).
49. Id. at 162.
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Co.50 involved changes in the time period for filing a request for
modification of a worker's compensation award. The old statute
provided for a two-year period commencing from the date of the
injury or the last payment of compensation benefits.5 1 The first
statutory change increased the limitation period to three years.52
The second statutory change shortened the limitation period to
two years, but added the language "or after the last payment of
medical benefits." 5 Neither change had a savings clause. The
plaintiff, however, received medical benefits longer than he re-
ceived compensation payments. The result was that if the second
statutory change were retroactive it would extend his filing period
so that his action would not be barred. Although the Garris court
noted that this case was "somewhat unusual in that the postpone-
ment of consideration of the 1955 claim resulted from the request
of the employer's insurance carriers, ' " the case did explicitly sup-
port the Gonzales dissent's position on retroactivity. 5
These two cases strongly support the dissent's position. Not only
was the supreme court willing to apply the enlarged statutes retro-
actively in the absence of savings clauses, but the court indicated
either explicitly or implicitly that retroactive application of an en-
larged period was not even considered retroactive legislation. 6
While these cases are theoretically distinguishable from Gonza-
les due to the traditionally liberal construction granted to worker's
compensation cases,57 the court in Gonzales made no attempt to
50. 132 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1960).
51. Ch. 23908, § 1, 1947 Fla. Laws 569.
52. Ch. 29778, § 4(1), 1955 Fla. Laws 462.
53. 132 So. 2d at 555.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 555-56:
The rule is well established that if an amending statute lengthens the period for
filing a claim allowed by an existing statute, prior to the expiration of the period
allowed by such existing statute, then the amending statute will be applicable to a
pending claim. If a claim has not been barred when an amending statute lengthens
the time within which it must be asserted, then the claimant gets the benefit of
the extended period.
See also, Walter Denson & Son v. Nelson, 88 So. 2d 120, 122 (Fla. 1956), "Here, again, it
appears to us that the better-reasoned rule is that if the period allowed by an existing stat-
ute has not run when the amending statute takes effect, then if the amending statute
lengthens the period allowed, it will be applicable to a pending case."
56. Corbett, 37 So. 2d at 162; Garris, 132 So. 2d at 556, (citing Walter Denson & Son v.
Nelson, 88 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1956); Corbett v. General Engineering and Machinery Co., 37 So.
2d 161 (Fla. 1948)).
57. In his dissent in Mazda Motors of Am., Inc. v. S.C. Henderson & Sons, 364 So. 2d
107 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979), Judge Boyer
criticized retroactive application of an extension of a limitation period for property damage.
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make such a distinction. This does not, however, foreclose the pos-
sibility of the court recognizing worker's compensation cases as an
exception to the apparently broad reaching effect of Gonzales.
It is arguable that enlarged statutes of limitation in worker's
compensation cases can be applied retroactively without a clear
manifestation of legislative intent. The legislature is normally re-
quired to clearly manifest its retroactive intent for enlarged limita-
tion periods. Notwithstanding the general situation, since worker's
compensation cases have traditionally been given more liberal con-
struction, these cases should be an exception. Such an approach
would lend consistency to the Gonzales opinion.58 Based upon this
argument, Gonzales would be seen as the general rule, with
worker's compensation cases as the exception.
The Gonzales dissent also cited a number of Florida district
court cases which support its position. These cases involved causes
of action other than worker's compensation claims. Neff v. General
Development Corp. was an action based upon the negligent per-
formance of electrical work.' The change in the statute of limita-
tions was an enlargement. The amendment occurred during the
same statutory revision and was subject to the same savings
clause6 ° as the one construed in Gonzales. Neff clearly supports
the dissent's position. The Neff opinion never mentioned the sav-
ings clause as the reason for retroactive application of the statute.
This is significant because it indicates that no legislative intent of
retroactivity for enlarged limitation periods is necessary. In addi-
tion, the court stated that "[a]bsent a legislative mandate to the
contrary it is the enlarged limitation period which is applicable to
mature causes of action not otherwise barred prior to the effective
date of the longer period."" The district court would only recog-
nize an express statement to the contrary as a basis for preventing
the retroactive application of enlarged limitation periods. This is
the exact converse of the Gonzales test, which requires express ret-
roactive intent for enlarged limitation periods.
Patterson v. Sodders involved the statutory time period for
"Appellant relies upon three cases involving workmen's compensation claims, an area of the
law which has traditionally received liberal consideration by the legislature and courts
alike." 364 So. 2d at 109 (Boyer, Acting C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
58. However, there is another Florida Supreme Court case, Ruhl v. Perry, 390 So. 2d 353
(Fla. 1980), which is not a worker's compensation case but which also adopts the dissent
position. See notes 74-79 infra and accompanying text.
59. 354 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
60. Ch. 74-382, § 36, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207.
61. 354 So. 2d at 1276 n.1 (citation omitted).
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filing a request for support in a paternity proceeding.2 The statu-
tory period, which commenced from the date the child was born,
was increased from three63 to four"' years. The amendment did not
contain a savings clause. The defendant argued that the trial court
erred in applying the four-year statute of limitations period be-
cause the change occured after the child's birth.65 The district
court held that the four-year period was applicable." This case
supports application of enlarged statute of limitations even though
the statutory change does not include a savings clause.
In Martz v. Riskamm, 7 the statutory period for filing a dower
interest claim, which is closely analogous to a statute of limita-
tions,68 was extended. The old statute required a filing "nine
months after the first publication of notice to creditors or three
years after death of her husband, whichever first occurs."6 9 The
amended statute deleted the three year cap provision.70 There was
no publication of notice to creditors in Martz. The court held that
the extended statutory period was to be applied retroactively be-
cause the statutory period had not run prior to the amendment.
71
Furthermore, the court adopted this position even though the
amendment was "silent as to whether it would apply to claims
then in existence '7 2 and did not contain a savings clause.
The dissent's position on retroactivity is well supported. Al-
though not mentioned in Gonzales, there are several other district
court cases which support the dissent's position. 3 In addition, as
late as November 1980, the Florida Supreme Court was still recog-
62. 167 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
63. Ch. 21892, § 1, 1943 Fla. Laws 408.
64. Ch. 59-188, § 1, 1959 Fla. Laws 330.
65. 167 So. 2d at 790.
66. Id. at 790-91.
67. 144 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
68. Id. at 88.
69. Ch. 57-408, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws 952.
70. Ch. 59-123, § 1, 1959 Fla. Laws 224.
71. 144 So. 2d at 87-88.
72. Id. at 88.
73. E.g., Birnholz v. Steisel, 394 So. 2d 523, 524-25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (statute
of limitations extended from three to four years by an act which had a savings clause);
Wetmore v. Brennan, 378 So. 2d at 81 (suit on a promissory note and extension of a statute
of limitation by an amendment to language concerning computation of when the cause of
action accrued); Glass v. Camara, 369 So. 2d 625, 627 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (allowing
extension of statute in a wrongful death action, noting that the condition precedent of medi-
cal mediation influenced the court's decision); Robinson v. Johnson, 110 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (worker's compensation case involving both an enlarging and a
shortening of a limitation period).
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nizing retroactive application of statutes of limitations which were
extended by amendments to a substantive portion of the statute.
In Ruhl v. Perry7 4 the supreme court analyzed the changes in
limitation periods for a note under seal. The old statute provided a
twenty-year period.7 5 The first amendment, which occured during
the same statutory revision as the amendment in Gonzales, less-
ened the statutory period to five years.76 The amendment included
a savings clause.77 During the savings clause's grace period, the leg-
islature again amended the statute by changing the language which
determined when the cause of action accrued. This change in the
determination of accrual was from "the date of issuance of the
note" to "when the first written demand was made. ' 78 This
amendment, as applied to the particular facts in Ruhl, enlarged
the statutory period because there was no written demand. The
court held that this amendment would be retroactively applied. 9
It is difficult to reconcile Ruhl with Gonzales. One possible ex-
planation of the discrepancy is that instead of Gonzales being the
general rule, it is the exception. Although the Gonzales opinion
contains no language indicating that the holding is limited to med-
ical malpractice actions, one can speculate that the particular con-
cerns surrounding medical malpractice might qualify these actions
as an exception to the general rule of retroactive application of en-
larged limitation periods. It can be argued, for example, that pro-
fessional malpractice is distinguishable from other claims since the
professionals' reputations and livelihoods are often at stake. Thus,
the court may be less inclined to extend limitation periods for mal-
practice claims.
The medical field is also an area fraught with extremely high
insurance rates. These rates increase the cost of services to all pa-
tients. Thus, the court's focus in the medical malpractice area
might be a more attenuated version of the same goal achieved by
the worker's compensation cases. In worker's compensation cases,
the goal is to construe the statute most favorably toward the
worker so that injured workers receive the greatest benefit. The
court's focus in medical malpractice actions, however, may be not
74. 390 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1980).
75. Ch. 21892, § 1, 1943 Fla. Laws 408.
76. Ch. 74-382, § 7, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207.
77. Ch. 74-382, § 36, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207. Based upon prior law and the Gonzales opin-
ion, this shortened statute would be retroactive in effect.
78. Ch. 75-234, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 678.
79. 390 So. 2d at 356.
CASE NOTES
only the injured plaintiff, but patients in general. Therefore, the
court, in achieving its goal of spreading costs might feel that keep-
ing insurance rates low and stabilizing medical costs is preferable
to compensating a small number of injured plaintiffs who would
benefit from enlarged limitation periods.
A more cynical and perhaps more realistic explanation of why
Gonzales could be an exception to the general rule of retroactivity
of enlarged limitation periods is that the court was primarily con-
cerned with the effect of high insurance rates on medical profes-
sionals. In any event, it is possible that Gonzales stands for the
proposition that with certain types of causes of action, an excep-
tion to the general rule of retroactivity exists.
It appears that.the dissent's position in Gonzales is supported
by the weight of Florida case law. The dissent, however, never fully
discussed the policy considerations behind its approach, other than
to state that the Fourth District "applied the retroactivity con-
cerns of shortened statute cases to an extended statute case.""
The basic premise of a statute of limitations is that all causes of
action and potential liabilities must eventually come to an end.81
Underlying this premise is a philosophy relating the two concepts
of notice and fairness. Notice requires that a plaintiff be suffi-
ciently aware of the length of time in which she has to determine
whether to seek legal redress. On the part of the defendant, notice
requires that he be aware of the time length of his exposure to
potential liability. Fairness requires that the length of time for
filing an action should not be changed to either party's detriment.
These concepts, as applied to an amendment which shortens a
statute of limitation, mandate that the amendment not function
retroactively. First, one can view the equities from the plaintiff's
perspective. If a plaintiff relies upon a specified period of time to
file an action, then the notice concept requires that the time period
should not be summarily terminated.82 Fairness also requires non-
retroactive application of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff
would be deprived of a valuable right if her cause of action was
80. 400 So. 2d at 968.
81. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 326 So. 2d 177, 181 (Fla. 1976). See
also, Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25, 36 (Fla. 1976), stating that "[t]he purposes of the
statutes of limitations are to protect defendants against unusually long delays in filing of
lawsuits and to prevent unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which interested
persons have been thrown off guard for want of reasonable prosecution."
82. This is one reason why in Florida there is a constitutional mandate that a statute of
limitation which shortens the time period contain a savings clause. Gonzales, 400 So. 2d at
967.
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summarily terminated. From the defendant's perspective, nonret-
roactive application of a shortened statute of limitations does not
violate the concepts of fairness nor notice. The defendant's initial
perception of the length of his potential liability would continue to
be accurate. The defendant would not be detrimentally affected by
the nonretroactive application of a shortened statute of limitations,
but rather he would simply not receive the benefit of the shortened
time period. The application of these concepts to a shortened stat-
ute of limitations results in the conclusion announced by the case
law in Florida: shortened statutes of limitation are not retroactive
in effect unless there is an express, clear manifestation of legisla-
tive intent of retroactivity and a savings clause.8
Applying the concepts of notice and fairness to an enlarged stat-
ute of limitations period also initially appears to require that the
statute not be given retroactive effect. The concept of notice from
the plaintiff's perspective would not be violated by the nonretroac-
tive application of an enlarged time period. The plaintiff's initial
perception of the time period in which her cause of action must be
filed would remain the same. The concept of fairness would not be
violated if the plaintiff did not benefit from the enlarged period.
From the defendant's perspective, both the notice and fairness
concepts could be violated by reviving risks of liability if an en-
larged statute of limitations period was retroactive in application.
An increase in the length of the defendant's potential liability
would be unfair to him. In addition, the concept of notice might
also be violated in that the defendant would have justifiably relied
on the initial determination of the length of his liability. Most
courts, however, have indicated that the notice concept is irrele-
vant as a policy consideration when applied to the defendant.
Courts have addressed the notice issue by stating that a defendant
does not have a vested right in a statute of limitations until it has
run.8' The conclusion is that the defendant has no right to be free
from potential liability and therefore enlarged statutes of limita-
tions can be retroactive in effect.
In summary, the policy considerations are inconclusive in decid-
83. Id.
84. E.g., Corbett v. General Eng'r. & Mach. Co., 37 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. 1948), states
that "a statute of limitations enlarging the time within which an action may be brought as
to pending cases is not retroactive legislation and does not impair any vested right"; 51 AM
JUR. 2d Limitation of Actions § 40 (1970) states that "the general principal [is] that a per-
son has no vested right in the running of a statute of limitations unless it has completely
run and barred the action." (Citations omitted).
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ing the question of retroactive aplication of enlarged statutes. Pol-
icy arguments can be made both for and against retroactivity.
In conclusion, the Florida Supreme Court announced a new rule
for retroactive application of amendments to a statute of limita-
tions which enlarges the existing limitation period. Whether the
rule announced in Gonzales applies to all causes of action or
whether it is limited to medical malpractice actions is unclear. The
existence of inconsistent opinions indicates that the rule in Gonza-
les might be limited in the future to medical malpractice actions.
Thus, plaintiffs seeking to avoid the Gonzales rule will argue that
their actions are analogous to a worker's compensation case or a
contract action rather than a medical malpractice cause of action.
Therefore, under a conflicting line of cases, they should be given
the benefit of an enlarged period. On the other hand, the broad,
unqualified language of Gonzales indicates that the court intends
it to apply to all causes of action. This approach seems the most
likely.
None of the amendments to the statute of limitations since 1973
contain any express, clear manifestation by the legislature that en-
largements are to be retroactive,8" therefore under the broad inter-
pretation of Gonzales plaintiffs will not receive the enlarged pe-
riod. One example of an enlargement which would not be
retroactive under the broad interpretation of Gonzales is the 1980
amendment to section 95.11(3)(c)" of the Florida Statutes regard-
ing actions founded on design, planning or construction of an im-
provement to real property. The amendment extended the cap
provision from twelve to fifteen years. Under the broad interpreta-
tion of Gonzales, plaintiffs whose causes of action accrue prior to
July 2, 1980, the effective date of the statute, will not be able to
take advantage of the three-year extension. Only further develop-
ment of the case law will clarify whether the new rule established
in Gonzales is to be applied broadly or narrowly.
CAROL RUEBSAMEN TIERNEY
85. The statute of limitations was amended by the following: ch. 75-9, § 7, 1975 Fla.
Laws 13; ch. 77-174, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 719; ch. 78-435, § 11, 1978 Fla. Laws 1448; ch. 80-
322, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 1389.
86. (Supp. 1980).
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